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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract
THE IMPACT OF POLICE MISCONDUCT IN KINGS COUNTY
ON NEW YORK CITY’S CIVIL LIABILITY 2006-2010.

By
Brian A. Maule

Adviser: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld
The confluence of police misconduct and civil liability is an issue of growing concern for
many communities throughout the U.S. today. The gravamen of the issue is evident in increases
in the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct and the civil liability that results from these
lawsuits.
In New York City during the period 1997-2005 the cost for police misconduct went from
$27.9 million in 1997 to $40.4 million in 2005 (Thompson, 2007). Concerns over these
increases have resulted in efforts to curb both the number of lawsuits brought against the New
York Police Department and the civil liability to the City that results from these lawsuits.
The study examines and describes the impact of allegations of police misconduct in
Kings County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability. Using allegations
of police misconduct in lawsuits that resulted in a settlement or jury award as a measure of police
misconduct, the study provides evidence of the increasing costs of police misconduct in Kings
iv

County, New York. The study found that the increasing financial impact that police misconduct
had on the City during the years studied was not the result of the increasing costs of settlements
and jury awards per se but rather the increase in the number of lawsuits vis-à-vis the increase in
the incidence of police misconduct.
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Introduction

The confluence of police misconduct and civil liability is an issue of growing concern for
many communities throughout the U.S. today. On the one hand the concern of police and
municipal officials is the financial burden that resulted from lawsuits alleging police misconduct
(Emery and Maazel, 2000; Ross, 2000; Vaughn et al., 2001),1 On the other hand, the concern is
the social injury to the general community particularly in this new era of community policing.
The gravity of the issue is evident in nation-wide increases in the number of lawsuits alleging
police misconduct and the civil liability that results from these lawsuits (Champion, 2001; U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights, 2000; Human Rights Watch, 1998). For example, research by the
International Association of Chiefs of Police (2001) found a ten times increase in the number of
civil lawsuits filed against police officers and their departments in the years 1976-1991.
According to Ross (2000) the average plaintiff’s (the person who initiated the lawsuit) award for
police misconduct in the U.S. during the years 1989-1999 was more than $492,000 with an
additional $60,000 awarded for attorney fees. This compares to the average non-police tort
award of $52,000 nation-wide (U.S. Dept. Justice, 1996).
In New York City (“City”) during the period 1977-2005 the cost for police misconduct
went from $27.9 million in 1997 to $40.4 million in 2005 (Thompson, 2007). Concerns over
these increases have resulted in efforts to curb both the number of lawsuits brought against the
New York Police Department (“NYPD”) and the civil liability of the City that results from these
lawsuits.2 Nevertheless, despite many efforts year after year the City continues to spend millions
of dollars to litigate civil lawsuits brought against the NYPD for alleged officer misconduct.3 For
example, there were 35,379 incidents of misconduct alleged against officers of the NYPD in the
period 2006-2010. These incidents resulted in 14,955 legal claims4 and 193 million dollars paid

to settle these claims. 5 This compares to 25,999 incidents and 176.6 million dollars paid in
settlements and jury awards for the period 2001-2005.6 This is in addition to significant but less
obvious litigation costs, arguably in the millions, including but not limited to employee salaries
investigating the allegations, and sometimes trial expenses to defend these claims. While these
increases were city-wide, they were more pronounced in Bronx and Kings Counties. For
example, in Kings County alone (Brooklyn) there was a 70% increase in the number of
allegations for 2006-2010 compared to the period 2001-2005 and a 269% increase in civil
liability to the City.
The study examines and describes the impact of allegations of police misconduct in
Kings County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability. Allegations of
police misconduct that resulted in a settlement or jury award were used as a measure of police
misconduct. The study reviewed 2076 lawsuits filed in Kings County New York during the years
2006-2010 to examine and describe the impact of police misconduct on the City’s civil liability.
Allegations of police misconduct in Kings County were chosen because, as the most populous
borough of the City, and demographically representative of the entire city, it was expected that a
larger number of lawsuits would be brought in Kings County than in the other NYC boroughs.
Furthermore, prior research showed that the crime rate in both the Eastern District and Southern
District of New York7 are comparable, and although arrest rates are higher in the Southern
District than they are in the Eastern District, the number of §1983 lawsuits8 per 100,00 of the
population is higher in the Eastern District (Chiabi, 1995). Therefore, an empirical understanding
of the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County on the City’s civil liability can
be generalized to the entire city. It was also possible that the yearly increases in both the number
of lawsuits filed against the NYPD and the resulting climb in total civil liability for Kings
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County would imply that existing NYPD policies and programs were inadequate at preventing
police misconduct city-wide and as such, may be contributing to the City’s civil liability.

Statement of the Problem
In recent years New Yorkers have experienced several high-profiled lawsuits against the
NYPD as a result of questionable police actions. From the sodomy of Abner Louima, the killings
of Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell, to the increasing number of civilian complaints and lawsuits
filed as a result of the NYPD’s Stop, Question and Frisk program, questions of the
appropriateness of police conduct and the adequacy of the City’s civil liability remain issues of
contentious debate. Moreover, while these incidents tend to galvanize public discourse that
continue long after they occur, it is the social injury that results, and the fact that these incidents
may represent increases in police misconduct and civil liability that concern some New York
City officials (Liu, 2010).9
Official data from the Civilian Complaint Review Board (“CCRB”) show that there were
12,504 incidents of alleged police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010.10 These
civilian complaints resulted in 2076 lawsuits at a cost of more than $56.2 million to the City (See
Table 4.5). As shown in Table 4.2 these numbers also reflect a trend of yearly increases in
allegations of police misconduct.
Highlighting this trend of increasing allegations of police misconduct and resulting civil
liability is the fact that in compiling their annual reports, successive Comptrollers noted that the
NYPD was the only New York City agency11 to experience an increase in the number of lawsuits
brought against it in each of the fiscal years 2001-2006 (Thompson, 2007) and surpassed all
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other city agencies in 2010 in becoming the city agency with the most lawsuits brought against it
(Liu, 2011).12
The increases in police misconduct and resulting civil liability were even more
problematic because they occurred at a time when New York City, like most U.S. cities were
financially strapped and the NYPD, like other police departments throughout the U.S., had
embraced community-oriented policing which requires greater police accountability and
increased public involvement in fighting crime (Human Rights Watch, 1998).

Purpose of Study
The financial impact of police misconduct lawsuits on municipalities in the U.S. is well
documented (del Carmen, 1991; Hall et al., 2003; Kappeler, 1993; Kappeler & Kappeler, 1993;
Silver, 2001; Stevens, 2001; Thrum, 1992; Vaughn & Coomes, 1995; Vaughn, 1999; Vaughn et
al., 2001; Worrall, 2001; Pipes & Pape, 2001; Kappeler, Kappeler & del Carmen, 1993; Escholz
& Vaughn, 2001; Kappeler & Vaughn, 1997; Vaughn & Kappeler, 1999; Ross, 2000; Vaughn et
al., 2001) and more specifically the impact of §1983 lawsuits13 in Central California (Eisenberg
& Schwab, 1987); in Pennsylvania and Georgia (Schwab & Eisenberg, 1988), and with Bivens
actions14 in the Southern and Eastern District of New York (Chiabi, 1995). However, the impact
of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010 on New York
City’s civil liability was uncertain.
Therefore, although egregious incidents of police misconduct in the City were well
publicized and past studies (Cohen, 1972; Kane, 2001; Kane, 2002; Reuss-Ianni, 1983) and
commissions (Knapp, 1972; Mollen, 1994) explored and documented them, none explored the
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impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County on the City’s civil liability for the
years 2006-2010.
While it is accepted that an allegation of police misconduct may not be equal to actual
police misconduct, an allegation being simply a claim and not uncontroverted evidence of the
incident, given the adversarial and expositive nature of the judicial system arguably a settlement
or a jury award based on an allegation can be interpreted as a substantiated probability that the
alleged incident did in fact occur. It is within this context that the study sought to fill the gap by
examining the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings County during the years
2006-2010 on the City’s civil liability. Using allegations of police misconduct that resulted in a
settlement or jury award as a measure of police misconduct, the study addressed the following
broad question: what was the impact of police misconduct in Kings County on New York City’s
civil liability for the years 2006-2010?
The following research questions informed by independent causes of action alleged in
lawsuits were used to accomplish this:
Research Questions
Research Question 1: What is the relationship between allegations of false arrest and civil
liability?
Research Question 2: What is the relationship between allegations of assault/battery and
civil liability?
Research Question 3: What is the relationship between allegations of a police shooting
and civil liability?
Research Question 4: What is the relationship between allegations of inadequate police
training and civil liability?
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Chapter II Literature Review

By its very nature, policing in general is a complex and unique occupation (Alpert and
McDonald, 2001; Cohen, 1996). In the U.S. the characteristics of public accountability, openness
to evaluation and responsiveness to citizen demands (Bayley, 1998) contribute to the inimitable
nature of policing in that police officers, in interpreting and applying static and dynamic rules,
are legally permitted to act in ways, such as using deadly force, that would be criminal if
committed by a civilian (Alpert and McDonald, 2001; Cohen, 1996). Furthermore, by working in
isolation from public observation, police officers are provided with ample opportunities to
misuse their authority (Dunningham and Norris, 1998; Escholz and Vaughn, 2001; Moran, 2005)
in what some have argued is an occupation conducive to malpractice (Hunter, 1999; Ivkovic,
2004). Moreover, the unique character of policing, and the lack of consensus on the frequency of
police misconduct, with some arguing that it is rare (Chappell and Piquero, 2004) and others the
opposite (Ivkovich, 2003; Worden and Catlin, 2002), make police misconduct difficult to define
and difficult to document (Kane and White, 2009).

Police Misconduct
Police misconduct, like any other behavior that deviates from the norms of a society, is as
varied and diverse as the norms themselves. This is apparent in the ease with which some forms
of police behavior can readily be labeled as misconduct but it also underlies the difficulty in
articulating a cogent definition of the term.
One well accepted definition proffered by Roebuck and Barker (1974) defines police
misconduct as behavior that is deviant, dishonest, improper, unethical or criminal. Similar broad
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definitions have been suggested by Skogan and Meares (2004) and by Klenig (2006). While
these definitions specify “police misconduct” as the term being defined, arguably they can be
attributed to malpractice in almost any profession and they do not capture the unparalleled
authority that police officers possess, and the “or else” power that underlies every command
from police officer to civilian.
The U.S. Supreme Court provides a more nuanced definition of police misconduct as the
“[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the
wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of the state” (Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457
U.S. 922-929,1982). In other words the police officer uses his or her authority to engage in jobspecific malpractice (Kane, 2002). While more acceptable, at its core this definition seems to
suggests that police misconduct is an affirmative “misuse of power.” Therefore, in recognizing
that police misconduct can also include acquiescence or non-action, such as the acceptance of
free meals or the disregard of a legal obligation, in operationalizing police misconduct,
researchers have used behaviors as diverse as corruption (Sherman, 1978); wrongful death
(Kappeler, Vaughn and del Carmen, 1991); use of excessive force (Thurm, 1992); police sexual
violence (Escholz and Vaughn, 2001; Kappeler and Vaughn, 1997); acceptance of free meals
(Alpert and Dunhan, 1997) and sleeping while on duty (Barker and Carter, 1994) to examine it.
Moreover, because of the variance in operationalizing police misconduct, it is generally a
well-accepted argument that every police organization has experienced some form of misconduct
during its existence (Kappeler at al., 1998; McCafferty, Souryal and McCafferty, 1998).
Furthermore, by its nature, policing provides multiple opportunities for deviance and malpractice
(Barker, 1997; Ivkovic, 2004), because of policing’s low visibility to public observation
(Goldstein, 1960; Haar, 1997; Haar & Morash, 1999) in addition to the difficulty in defining it,
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police misconduct is also difficult to document (Kane and White, 2009), and efforts to identify
its correlates have been inconclusive (Chappell and Piquero, 2004; Fyfe & Kane, 2006). Most of
the difficulty in documenting police misconduct lies in the unique nature of policing itself (King
2009; Manning 2009), as police officials and officers tend to define behavior that constitutes
misconduct narrowly while the public defines it broadly (Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b; Lersch
and Mieczkowski, 2000). This disparity in determining what behavior constitutes police
misconduct is evident in the number of public complaints filed against police officers compared
to the number of those complaints that are substantiated by the agency charged with investigating
the complaints. For example, in New York City there were 52,049 formal complaints of police
misconduct filed with the City’s Civilian Complaints Review Board (“CCRB”) 15 for the period
2006-2010. These complaints resulted in 36,743 investigations16 but only 1,513 of those
complaints were substantiated by the CCRB.
Still, while less than 3% of formal complaints of NYPD officer misconduct allegations
filed during 2006-2010 were substantiated, whether as a result of more civil rights conscious
citizens, an increasingly litigious society, controversial actions such as the NYPD’s Stop and
Possibly Frisk program,17 or some of each, the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct
against NYPD officers and the civil liability that resulted, increased during the period 20062010.
Lawsuits against the City alleging police misconduct are based on one or more of the
following:

False arrest.
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False arrest is an allegation that police acting under color of law violated the individual’s
freedom of movement without having probable cause to do so. In most lawsuits it is a
warrantless arrest and is presumptively illegal because it is made without the judicial process that
is required in obtaining a warrant (Broughton v. State, 1975). This distinction is notable because
an allegation of a false arrest places the burden of proof on the police to show that probable
cause existed to make the arrest.

Police shooting.
A police shooting when claimed to have violated the victim’s Fourth Amendment right to
be free from search and seizure18 is based on the allegation that the force used was excessive and
therefore unreasonable (Stein v. State 53 A.D. 2d 988, 1976). According to the U.S. Supreme
Court the legality of the use of force is determined by whether or not the force used was
objectively reasonable and therefore must be evaluated within the context of the “severity of the
crime at issue, whether the suspect posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether [the individual] actively resisted arrest or attempted to evade arrest.”
(Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396).

Assault/Battery.
Although these are two separate acts, they are usually pled and adjudicated together.
When alleged in a police misconduct lawsuit, assault/battery like a police shooting is based on
the claim that police used more force than was reasonably necessary.19

Inadequate police training.
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Inadequate police training is claimed in some police misconduct lawsuits regardless of
the violation alleged and the injury claimed. A lawsuit filed in a federal court against the NYPD
oftentimes claims that the City failed to “train, supervise and discipline” the police officer
alleged to have violated the individual’s constitutional rights. A lawsuit filed in a state court
often alleges that the City was negligent in the “hiring, training and retention” of the police
officer who is the subject of the lawsuit. The difference is notable because while an allegation in
a state court (negligent hiring) is almost impossible to prove because it is a ministerial act
cloaked in immunity, an allegation in a federal court (inadequate police training and retention) is
subjected to an objective standard and may not be so cloaked (Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 1982)
Although federal and state lawsuits were adjudicated in different forums, because both
assert police training as a cause of action and because the data used in this study comprised both
federal and state lawsuits, both claims were consolidated in this study as “inadequate police
training.”
Law enforcement, including the use of deadly force, is often a matter of individual
judgment and individual discretion (Hayden, 1980). Nevertheless, that judgment and the use of
discretionary authority must be within the guidelines of the required conduct first learned in the
police academy (Harris, 1973, Kappeler et al., 1998). Therefore, although recruitment, selection
and training provide qualified police officers to do the job, to get the job done right, the officer
must work within the guidelines of his or her training. Thus, despite some contention that
training is an inadequate method of preventing police misconduct (Emery & Mazel, 2000) it is
generally accepted that not only does training reduce incidents of police misconduct (Collins,
1997; Vaughn and Coomes, 1995) but proactive policing itself may be unsuccessful without
proactive training (Haberfeld, 2002). Moreover, even though the effectiveness of training to
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prevent police misconduct and thus civil liability is debatable, not many would disagree that it
should continue to be a part of any police academy curriculum. In fact, Scogin and Brodsky
(1991), in a survey of police academy cadets found that cadets were concerned about workrelated lawsuits. This suggests that the academy is the appropriate place to establish awareness of
the impact of police misconduct on a municipality’s civil liability.

Police Misconduct and Civil liability
It is well accepted that the control of police misconduct, like crime itself, is directly
related to the performance of the government, and to the safety and perceived well-being of
citizens in a democratic society (Franklin, 1999). Efforts to curb police misconduct can be
classified based on whether these efforts are regulatory, legislative or judicial (Swanson, Territo
and Taylor, 2001). Regulatory controls are basically administrative and involve disciplinary
measures within the police organization aimed at controlling individual officer conduct (Iris,
1998). Legislative and judicial efforts come in the form of statutes and court decisions and are
aimed at the individual police officer and his or her organization. They include criminal
prosecutions of police officers which are rare (Amnesty International, 2000) though effective at
punishing the individual police officer and deterring others (Agathocleous, 1998) and civil
lawsuits against officers and/or their police organizations which are ubiquitous and aimed mostly
at reforming the police organization and its subculture (Agathocleous, 1998; Barrineau, 1994;
Fallon & Meltzer, 1991; Gilles, 2001). Besides an individual officer’s conduct is often shaped by
the subculture of the organization (Kappeler et al., 1998) and prior studies suggest that legislative
and judicial efforts may be more effective at controlling misconduct than regulatory efforts
because in targeting the organization and its subculture (Reiner, 1998) with prescribed civil
11

liability, legislative and judicial efforts provide an incentive for police departments to modify
their training of their police officers (Papik, 2004).
In New York City legislative and judicial efforts are effectuated with the filing of civilian
complaints and/or lawsuits. Allegations of police misconduct in the City are investigated either
by the CCRB or the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) with jurisdiction determined by
the nature of the complaint. Allegations of the use of force, whether or not it is alleged to be
excessive, abuse of authority, discourtesy or use of foul language, are investigated by the CCRB.
By comparison, if what is alleged involves serious physical injury or death then the investigation
is done by the IAB.20 Even if not substantiated by the CCRB or IAB, complaints of police
misconduct that allegedly violated the individual’s U.S. or New York state constitutional rights
are legally actionable, and if successful, impose civil liability on the City. For example, of the
10,548 CCRB and IAB complaints of misconduct alleged in 2010 against NYPD officers,21 some
3,987 new claims resulted and the City paid approximately $56.4 million dollars in judgments
and settlements for existing claims.22 This compares to 9,048 complaints, 2,221 lawsuits and 25
million dollars for 2006. These increases in both the number of claims of police misconduct and
the resulting civil liability in New York City, while of concern to City officials (Liu, 2011,
Thompson, 2007), exemplify the growing nexus between police misconduct and civil liability
nationwide (Emery & Maazel, 2000).23

Legal basis for civil Liability.
New York City was first exposed to civil liability for the acts or omissions of its
employees in 1945 when New York’s highest state court, the Court of Appeals, held that “civil
divisions of the State are answerable equally with individuals and private corporations for
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wrongs of officers and employees” (Bernadine v. City, 294 N.Y. 361, 365. 1945). This case in
effect abolished the long held doctrine of sovereign immunity for municipalities of New York
State.24 However, because it came from a state court, the ruling did not apply to federal civil
rights violations.
Some 16 years later in the seminal case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 US 167 (1961) the U.S.
Supreme Court held that 42 U.S.C. was the basis for individual police officer liability because
the police conduct alleged violated the constitutional rights of the victim. In this case Monroe
and his wife were held naked in their living room by thirteen Chicago police officers while their
home was searched without a search warrant. Monroe was subsequently held in jail for ten hours
and later released without being charged with a crime. Monroe sued both the individual police
officers and the City of Chicago. The U.S. Supreme Court found that the individual officers were
civilly liable but the City of Chicago was not because it was not a “person”25 within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. §1983.
In 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that municipalities were in fact
“persons” and equally important the Court rejected the argument that a municipality was
vicariously liable whenever a police officer violated an individual’s constitutional rights. The
municipality was liable only if the violated individual could prove the existence of an official
policy, practice, custom or usage that deprived him or her of a federal constitutional or federal
statutory right (Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). In
application the City of New York is liable for the misconduct of NYPD officers if the individual
alleging the violation can show that his or her injury was the result of some official policy,
practice or custom of the NYPD. More specifically, the individual alleging the violation must
show that the NYPD had a formal written policy or procedure that expressly violated a federal
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constitutional or federal statutory right (Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S.1, 1985)26 or a practice,
usage or custom arising out of the City’s failure to adequately train its police officers (Canton v.
Harris 489 U.S. 378, 1989).
To establish a practice, usage or custom it must be shown that the officer’s inadequate
police training was the result of the NYPD’s deliberate indifference to federal constitutional or
federal statutory rights of the individual, or, alternatively that if after having notice of the
violation by its police officers, the NYPD failed to address the problem by providing further
corrective training of its police officers. Without proof of these conditions, there is no municipal
civil liability, and if a violation did occur then there is only personal civil liability against the
individual police officer (Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 1986).
Whether the defendant is the NYPD, the individual police officer, or both, most lawsuits
alleging NYPD officer misconduct are brought under federal statute 42 U.S.C. §198327 which for
a number of reasons has become an effective means of obtaining relief for federal constitutional
or federal statutory violations (Barrineau, 1987; Kappeler, 1993; McCoy, 1986, 1987).

42 U.S.C. §1983.
Enacted into law on April 20, 1871, the Civil Rights Act codified as 42 U.S.C.
§1983 (“Act”) in relevant part provides that

“every person who, under color of any statute ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or Causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or Other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the Deprivation of any rights,
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privileges, or immunities Secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”28

The Act’s original purpose was to provide civil remedies for African Americans whose
constitutional rights were violated by government officials who were also members of the Klu
Klux Klan (“KKK”).29 Enforcement of the Act was so effective against the KKK that with the
Klan’s decline much of the Act fell into disuse until 1961 (Gaines, Kappeler & Vaughn, 1997;
Means, 2004) when the U.S. Supreme Court held that one purpose of the Act was to supplement
state remedies if those remedies were inadequate or unavailable (Monroe v. Pape 365 US 167,
1961).
Although the Act’s original purpose and early use was to go after individual Klan
members, and §1983 of the Act explicitly states “person”, in 1978 the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the term “person” to include a municipal government.30 This interpretation of the
term “person” to include a municipal government permits a police officer to be sued both in his
or her official and individual capacity. If the lawsuit is against the officer in his or her official
capacity then the lawsuit is essentially against the municipality. In contrast if the lawsuit is
against the police officer individually then the police officer is personally liable for the resulting
settlement or jury award because the injured party is seeking damages against the officer and not
from the municipality.31 Meanwhile, indemnification even when the police officer is personally
liable often resulted in the City paying the lion’s share of the settlement or jury award.32
In 1971 in the case of Bivens v. Six Unnamed Defendants the U.S. Supreme Court
expanded the application of 42 U.S.C. §1983 to include federal employees.33 With this expansion
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any law enforcement officer, whether federal, state or municipal if acting under color of law,34
can be individually liable for violating an individual’s constitutional or statutory rights.
The result of these interpretations of 42 U.S.C. together with citizens’ increased
awareness of their civil rights have “made Section 1983 the most utilized and lucrative form of
civil liability litigation against law enforcement officers” (Chiabi, 1995: 3) in the U.S. today.
Contributing to the lucrative use of 42 U.S.C. is the §1988 provision for the recovery of
attorney’s fees35 which are not available in a New York state lawsuit.36
Thus, while it is apparent that the recent U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of 42 USC
have led to increases in the number of lawsuits brought against police officers and/or their
departments and in civil liability to their municipalities, arguably these decisions seem to be in
keeping with the efforts of courts to control police misconduct through deterrence (Owen v. City
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 1980).

Civil liability as deterrence.
Fundamental to the use of civil liability as a method of controlling police misconduct is
the courts’ advocacy of civil liability’s deterrent power. Premised on the belief that even the
mere “threat of litigation and civil liability” is enough to deter a police officer’s future
misconduct (City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 575, 1986)37 many judicial decisions, from the
U.S. Supreme Court down to the lower courts, are replete with opinions on, and advocacy for,
the deterrent power of civil liability. In the words of Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
Antonin Scalia “[t]he damages a plaintiff recovers contributes significantly to the deterrence of
civil rights violations” (Memphis or her Community School Board v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299,
1986:307). Furthermore, more than mere advocacy for the deterrent power of civil liability, in
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2006 the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of the exclusionary rule in holding that civil
liability, not the suppression of evidence, was the appropriate remedy for a particular police
violation of a state law.38
Nevertheless, despite decades of judicial advocacy and reliance on the power of civil
liability, or the threat of it, at deterring future police misconduct, its effectiveness continues to be
unsettled and contentious.39 Some argue that civil liability deters future police misconduct
(Fallon & Meltzer, 1991; Giles, 2000), and others contending that it does not (Armacost, 2003;
Levinson, 2000; Miller, 1998). Proponents of the deterrent power of civil liability as a method
of controlling police misconduct point to studies that found that police officers believed that civil
liability was a deterrent (Avery & Rudovsky, 1981; Champion, 1988; Garrison, 1995; Hall et al.,
2003; Hughes, 2001; Nahmod, 1982, 1984, 1986).40 In contrast, some studies have reported that
although police officers expressed concern about civil liability, their concerns did not translate to
their interactions with citizens on the street (Kappeler et al., 2001; Garrison, 1995). In fact
Novak et al. (2003), in their survey and observation of thousands of police encounters with
citizens, found that not only did most officers initiate aggressive behavior and were undeterred
by the prospect of a civil lawsuit,41 but that officers who were previously sued were more
aggressive than those who were not. These studies support the position that police officers not
only are undeterred by civil liability or the threat of it but, because of indemnification, the
potential that they would be personally liable is slight (Davis, Small & Wohlberg, 1979; Meltzer,
1988; Miller, 1999); for often they, and even their supervisors, are unaware that substantial
monetary awards could be assessed against their municipality (City of Newport v. Fact Concerts,
Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269, 1981: Fyfe, 1993).42
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In the case of the NYPD, some have argued that deterrence is particularly ineffective
being that the City, like most U.S. municipalities, defends and indemnifies the individual officer
when he or she is hit with a settlement or jury award.43

Indemnification
The City’s policy of indemnification is covered under the provisions of the New York
General Municipal Law (“GML”) which states that the City will indemnify and provide legal
representation to defend any public employee in a civil lawsuit that arises while that employee
was acting under color of law and in discharge of his or her duties and was not in violation of
any rule or regulation of his or her agency at the time the alleged act or omission occurred
(McKinney’s, 2000). In the case of the NYPD, if a police officer is sued for an incident
occurring while carrying out his or her duties and if he or she is not violating any NYPD rule or
regulation44 while doing so, the City will provide legal representation and may pay part, most or
all, of any settlement or jury award that will result.
This model of indemnification appears to be standard throughout the U.S. in that most
municipal employers indemnify their police officers for any settlement or jury award that
resulted from a lawsuit when the police officer acted under color of law (Davis et al., 1979). This
is evidenced in a study of §1983 lawsuits in Central California by Eisenberg et al. (1987) that
failed to find a single case in which the police officer sued was not indemnified by the
municipality regardless of the violation alleged.
Indemnification of police officers, even when they are found to have violated the
constitution that they are sworn to uphold, has led some to argue that civil litigation is an
ineffective method of punishing the individual officer and/or deterring him or her and others
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from future misconduct (Amnesty International, 2000; Armacost, 2004; Ass’n of The Bar of The
City of N.Y. COMM. 2000; Hoffman, 1993; Levinson, 2000). This is so, it is argued, because
police officers are so far removed from the litigation process that they have no knowledge when
lawsuits settle and the amount of the settlement (Emery and Mazel, 2000). Therefore, unless the
individual officer suffers some financial penalty he or she will not be deterred from future
misconduct (Davis et al., 1979). In contrast supporters of indemnification argue that not only is
indemnification not guaranteed to the officer being sued (Armacost, 1998), but without it the
social, financial and emotional harm (Davis et al., 1979; Giles, 2000; Schlanger, 2003) that
resulted can deter public service where the financial rewards pale in comparison to the costs of
civil liability (Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 1977; Howard, 2009).45
Nevertheless the increasing costs of civil liability resulting from police misconduct
lawsuits has led some scholars to propose different ways of maintaining the delicate balance
between controlling police misconduct and the unique function of policing. These suggestions
include using injunctive relief instead of a damages action (Giles, 2000), subtracting litigation
costs from police department budgets (Miller and Wright, 2004) and the British model of
requiring police officers, not unlike U.S. physicians, to have individual liability insurance (Otu,
2005). Although the British model of “policing the police” (Otu, 2005) appears promising, if for
no reason other than that it has been successfully implemented in a major jurisdiction, to date it
has not been tried in the U.S. and it is debatable if the political climate in most major U.S.
jurisdictions, and New York in particular, would be open to it.
What exists in New York City as well as in most U.S. jurisdictions is the allotment of
part of the settlement or jury award to the individual police officer that is somewhat proportional
to his or her violating conduct.46 However, because apportionment oftentimes is lopsided to the
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detriment of the taxpayer 47 some have argued for a more balanced approach to the allotment of
civil liability (Emery and Mazel, 2000). Again, given the political climate and the strength of the
police union in the City,48 more proportional civil liability may not be a viable option and
arguably may not further one of the general deterrent aims of civil liability: the incentive for
police departments to better train their officers.

Theoretical Explanations for Police Misconduct
Because most acts that constitute police misconduct are criminal when done without legal
authority or legal justification most theoretical explanations of police misconduct are
applications of existing criminological theories. Besides, some behaviors such as the use of foul
language, sleeping on the job, and the acceptance of free meals, though considered to be police
misconduct, are not criminal and arguably are best explained by adaptations of criminological
theories, such as Kappeler et al.’s (1998) “police worldview” explanation of police deviance
rather than by pure criminological theories. For example, in contending that police officers are
products of the society and that misconduct results not from personal characteristics but from the
confluence of the police organization’s subculture, the community and the law, Kappeler’s
“police worldview” can explain an officer’s acceptance of a free meal believing that “it comes
with the job” and a proprietor giving it believing that it was not a bribe but the “right thing to do”
to put his establishment in a more privileged position within the police subculture. In other words
it is the meeting of subculture, community and law that provides police officers with neutralizing
techniques based on non-legal standards that allow them the rationalization and justification for
their misconduct (Champion, 2001; Kappeler et al., 1998).
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However, while Kappeler’s “police worldview” is able to explain police misconduct that
is legal, police misconduct that is illegal, such as that contained in the data of the study, can best
be explained by Gottfredson and Hirschi’s control theory (1990) and Edwin Sutherland’s
differential association theory (1947).
Control theory proposes that individuals refrain from deviance and conform to the legal
definitions of their society because they are bonded to it. The strength of the societal bond is
controlled by, and varies, depending on the individual’s belief in the norms of their society, their
attachment and commitment to the social institutions, and their involvement in the conventional
activities within the society. Specifically, the individual’s self-control developed through his
socialization prevents him from becoming deviant (Hirschi, 1969). Deviance is therefore a
product of a lack of control and weakened or severed societal bonds and as such prior deviant
and criminal behavior can predict future offending. In fact, research by Cohen and Chaiken
(1973) support this in finding that police officers accused of misconduct were likely to have
questionable past employment histories such as prior job dismissals and discipline problems in
the military if they so served prior to their police employment.49
Nevertheless, while control theory can explain a police officer’s misconduct as a
continuation of prior malfeasance, arguably it cannot account for a new officer with strong
societal bonds becoming deviant after exposure to an existing police subculture.50 Developed in
the 1940’s, differential association theory asserts that deviance is present in normative conflict
because in modern societies definitions of law both favorable and unfavorable to its violation
exists (Sutherland, 1947). Differential association is the process by which individuals experience
these conflicting definitions. The balance of, and exposure to, these definitions determine
whether or not the individual will engage in conforming or deviant conduct, in that an excess of
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definitions favorable to the violation of law provides powerful reference conduct for individuals
associated with it (Conser, 1979).
In application differential association theory suggests that police misconduct is learned
by the individual officer in being associated with deviant conduct generated by non-conforming
officers within the police subculture and by being isolated from the law-abiding members of the
general public.
The police subculture characterized by conservatism, solidarity and a code of silence
(Kampanakis, 2002) provides an excess of malpractice definitions that directly affects the
individual’s conduct and allows officers ample opportunities to rationalize and justify their
misconduct (Kappeler et al., 1998). In other words in a police subculture where misconduct is
tolerated or even encouraged, the individual police officer learns favorable definitions of
misconduct that are acceptable within the subculture (Aultman, 1977; Conser, 1979). Research
has documented not only the existence of police subcultures (Conser, 1979) but has also found
that the attitude of police academy recruits change in becoming more accepting of peer
misconduct with the recruits increasing exposure to the police subculture as they advance from
academy to the streets (Savitz, 1970). Thus, differential association theory provides an
explanation not only for individual officer misconduct but also group malfeasance such as in the
Rodney King beating or group indifference or collusion as in the police sodomy of Abner
Louima.
Furthermore, as detailed earlier, one of the requirements for success in §1983 lawsuits is
the plaintiff’s showing of a “practice, usage or custom” within the police department (Monell,
1978). Differential association suggests that such a showing is more possible within a police
subculture that tolerates or encourages misconduct.
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Together, control theory and differential association theory can explain allegations of
police misconduct in lawsuits against a single or multiple police officers and have helped in
informing the study.
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Chapter III: Methodology

As mentioned earlier, police misconduct is difficult to document. One source of data is
the individual police officer or police official. What’s more, not only is it difficult to get
information from individual officers or police officials (Collins, 1988) but because of the
homogenous nature of police culture, findings from research at the individual level may be
mixed, ambiguous and lack variability (McManus, 1969; Grant and Grant, 1996). Though
somewhat more reliable than research at the individual level (Kane and White, 2009) research at
the organizational level may nonetheless reflect an organizational subculture of policies formed
by administrators but executed by individual police officers. For example, some police
organizations may have a “siege mentality” of “them versus us” that permits and even
encourages violent misconduct by individual police officers to maintain order on the streets
(Skolnick and Fyfe, 1993). In such cases research at the organizational level may also be limited
by its lack of variability but more importantly may suffer from external validity in that
administrative officials and supervisors in different police organizations may differ in what
constitutes police misconduct in their particular organization.
To overcome these difficulties many previous studies have used a variety of data sources
including publicly available official data such as civilian complaints to study police misconduct
(Kinnaird, 2006, Lawton et al., 2001; Lersch 1998a, 1996, 2002; Lersch & Mieczkowski, 2000;
Terril & McCluskey, 2002). While such data are well suited to study the conduct of public
officials (Henggeler et al., 1996), civilian complaints present a particular set of limitations
including under and over-reporting problems (Walker & Bumphus, 1992) and the problem of
perception as to what constitutes police misconduct. Prior research showed that not only do the
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public and police officers differ as to what constitutes misconduct (Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b;
Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2000) but also that more active police officers were likely to receive
more civilian complaints of misconduct than less active officers whether or not the conduct
complained of was within departmental guidelines (Lersch, 2002).
This study limited these weaknesses by using information from court files of police
misconduct lawsuits in Kings County, New York brought against the NYPD during the years
2006-2010. In examining and describing the impact of allegations of police misconduct in Kings
County during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability the study differed from
prior studies in two additional ways. First, the study was specific to the NYPD. Prior research
such as that of Chiabi (1996), in analyzing lawsuits alleging §1983 violations included Bivens
actions, i.e. lawsuits filed against federal law enforcement officers as well as the NYPD. Second,
in collecting data from both the Eastern District Court and Kings County state courts the study
captured all NYPD misconduct lawsuits filed in Kings County for the period 2006-2010 and
provided a more complete picture of police misconduct in Kings County and of civil liability to
the City of New York that resulted from police misconduct in Kings County.

Data
The data were collected from all publicly available court files containing lawsuits brought
both in Kings County state courts and the Eastern District Court of New York (because police
misconduct lawsuits alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 can be brought in either federal or
state courts). 51 For example, if the alleged police misconduct was only a violation of a federal
constitutional or federal statutory right, such as an illegal search, then the forum was either a
U.S. District Court or a New York state court. If the allegations of misconduct raised both
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federal and state issues, as they often did, then again the plaintiff could have chosen either
forum52 and, oftentimes chose both for strategic reasons.53 In addition, if the alleged misconduct
did not involve a federal constitutional or federal statutory violation, 54 such as a state tort of
assault and battery, then the forum was a New York state court; most often the New York State
Supreme Court.
Court files from the U.S. Eastern District Court were reviewed to eliminate allegations of
police misconduct in Queens, Nassau, Suffolk and Richmond counties and allegations against
federal employees (Bivens actions). In other words only misconduct lawsuits against the NYPD
arising from an incident that occurred in 2006-2010 in Kings County whether filed in a Kings
Court state court or the Eastern District Court were analyzed. Information including
demographics, the precinct having jurisdiction over the location of the incident, the violation
alleged and particulars of the disposition were collected.
There were 2076 civil lawsuits filed against the City of New York alleging police
misconduct in Kings County for the period 2006-2010. Of these 609 cases were eliminated for
several reasons. Most of them were eliminated because they imposed no liability on the City
having been abandoned, dismissed by the courts or decided for the City after a jury trial. A few
cases, even though they imposed liability on the City during 2006-2010, were eliminated because
the incident occurred before 2006. For example, the largest liability imposed on the City during
the years of the study was a 2010 settlement of $9.9 million for 19 years of wrongful
imprisonment following a false arrest. However, although the lawsuit was filed in 2006 and
disposed of in 2010, it was eliminated from the dataset because the incident occurred in 1984.
After such eliminations the remaining 1467 cases resolved either by settlement or trial
imposed civil liability on the City and form the dataset of the study.
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Table 3.1 Lawsuits 2006-2010

Year

Frequency

Percentage

2006

172

8.3

2007

335

16.1

2008

454

21.9

2009

473

22.8

2010

642

3.9

Total

2076

100

Variables
Most police misconduct lawsuits against the NYPD were based on an alleged violation of
the New York State Constitution and or the U.S. Constitution’s Fourth Amendment guaranty of
the right to be free from search and seizure without probable cause. Based on the nature of the
police action, the violation may have alleged a false arrest/imprisonment; an assault/battery; or a
police shooting. While these allegations were all based on police acting without probable cause
and were independent of each other, an assault/battery and a police shooting were based on the
specific claim that police used more force than was reasonably necessary (excessive force) in
the incident at issue.
Also, a plaintiff could allege that inadequate police training was the cause of the
violation. In other words regardless of, and in addition to, the primary violation (a false arrest, a
police assault or a police shooting) a plaintiff could also allege inadequate police training. When
an allegation of inadequate police training is successful, the settlement or jury award is
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exponentially greater than without it. Because of this, for the purpose of this study, an allegation
of inadequate police training was used in this study as being independent of its primary
allegation.
As expected, most lawsuits alleged multiple violations. Therefore the study used
anticipated cost to determine the primacy of the allegation. Specifically, if a lawsuit alleged
inadequate police training then it was determined to be the primary allegation. If the primary
allegation was a police shooting but did not allege that it was caused by inadequate police
training then, a police shooting was the primary allegation analyzed. A police assault was the
primary allegation when there was neither an allegation of a police shooting or of inadequate
police training. Finally, a false arrest was the allegation used when it was alleged and no other
allegation was claimed.
Thus, police misconduct was operationalized as a categorical group variable with four
independent variables: an allegation of a false arrest, an allegation of a police assault; an
allegation of a police shooting and an allegation of inadequate police training.

Independent Variables
An allegation of a false arrest was a claim that a police officer acting under color of law
violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from search and seizure by making
the arrest without the legally required probable cause to do so.
An allegation of a police shooting was a claim that police violated the individual’s Fourth
Amendment right by using more force than was reasonably necessary and resulting in injury or
death.
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An allegation of assault/battery: Although these were two separate acts they were usually
pled and adjudicated together. An allegation of assault/ battery was again based on the claim that
police used more force than was reasonably necessary.
An allegation of inadequate police training was a secondary claim that the primary
violation was the result of the officer’s deliberate indifference to the rights of the violated
individual which occurred because of inadequate police training.
For statistical comparison and uniformity, the selected allegations mirrored the categories
used by the Comptroller in compiling his annual report with one notable exception: an allegation
of inadequate police training.55 Although inadequate police training was absent as a separate
category in the Comptroller’s yearly analysis it was an independent variable in the study for
three reasons. First, prior research has shown that inadequate police training subjected
municipalities to civil liability (Collins, 1997). In fact when successful an allegation of
inadequate police training results in an exponentially larger award than the primary violation by
itself. Second, some lawsuits against the NYPD included this allegation regardless of the
violation alleged and when successful resulted in a large financial disposition. Third, in
suggesting that prior deviant and criminal conduct can predict future offending, control theory
infers that police officers who were the subjects of allegations of inadequate police training were
likely to have prior incidents of misconduct in their previous employment, or current police,
personnel files. Because a police officer’s personnel file, redacted of personal information such
as the officer’s home address, is subject to discovery, prior incidents of police misconduct
contained in the file may have helped to substantiate claims of negligent hiring, training and
retention and in doing so result in an exponentially larger civil disposition than if there were no
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prior incidents. For these reasons, an allegation of inadequate police training was used as the
principal allegation independent of, and instead of, its primary allegation.
Finally, differential association theory suggests that in the police subculture there are
definitions of the Fourth Amendment that are both favorable and unfavorable to its violation. For
this reason, differential association theory suggests that when there is an excess of definitions
favorable to its violation some police officers may not only stop, search and seize without Fourth
Amendment justification (reasonable suspicion and probable cause)56 but may have used
excessive force in doing so.

Dependent Variables
Regardless of what was alleged a lawsuit was disposed of in one of four ways. First, it
was abandoned or discontinued by the plaintiff. If a lawsuit was abandoned or discontinued then
for the purpose of the study, it had no impact on the City’s civil liability given that compared to a
settlement or judgment only a nominal amount of money was spent on investigating the
allegations of police misconduct. Second, a lawsuit was summarily dismissed by the court. Again
for the purpose of the study a dismissal had no impact on the City’s civil liability. Third, a
lawsuit could have been settled by the parties at any point of the litigation process prior to a jury
award. Lastly, a lawsuit was disposed of with a jury award against the City. Either of the last two
methods of disposition (settlement or jury award) resulted in civil liability to the City. Therefore,
the dependent group variable civil liability comprised the following three dependent variables:
Disposition Method, Disposition Cost, and Disposition Time.

30

Disposition Method: this was the legal method by which the lawsuit was resolved. It was a
dichotomous variable comprising a settlement or a jury award. Deposition method was coded 0
for a jury trial and 1 for a settlement.
Disposition Cost: this was the monetary amount accepted to dispose of the lawsuit. If the method
of disposition was a settlement then the disposition cost was the amount agreed to by plaintiff
and defendant to resolve the lawsuit. If the plaintiff and defendant did not settle the lawsuit and it
proceeded to a jury trial then the disposition cost was the monetary amount awarded to the
plaintiff by the jury. Disposition cost was measured in dollars.
Disposition Time: this was the time that it took for the lawsuit to be resolved, from filing to
disposition. In addition to the disposition cost imposed on the defendant by settlement or a jury
award when the lawsuit is successful, less obvious costs are incurred by both parties. For the City
like any other defendant, less obvious costs include the salaries of attorneys and investigators,
the costs of experts and of doctors to determine the nature and permanency of injury that the
plaintiff alleged. Because measuring their actual costs was beyond the scope of this study,
disposition time, a continuous variable, was used as a measure of these costs. Disposition Time
was measured in months.

Control Variables
While previous studies that used lawsuits to study police misconduct in general (Kappeler
& Kappeler, 1992; Kappeler, Kappeler, delCarmen, 1993; Schafer, Martinelli & Loper, 2001)
and police misconduct in New York in particular (Chiabi, 1995) did not use control variables,
this study controlled for two variables; the gender of the plaintiff and litigation representation
were covariates.
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Hypotheses
The following hypotheses were used to examine and describe the impact of allegations of
police misconduct in Kings County for the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil liability:

H1: Allegations of false arrest were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition
method.
H2: Allegations of false arrest were more likely to result in a smaller final disposition
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury.
H3: Allegations of assault/battery were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition
method.
H4: Allegations of assault/battery were more likely to result in a smaller final disposition
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury.
H5: Allegations of a police shooting were likely to result in a settlement as the disposition
method.
H6: Allegations of a police shooting were more likely to result in a smaller final
disposition when settlement was disposition method than if tried by a jury.
H7: Allegations of inadequate police training were likely to result in a jury trial as the
disposition method.
H8: Allegations of inadequate police training were more likely to result in a smaller final
disposition when a jury trial was the disposition method than if tried by a jury.
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H9: Allegations of an assault were likely to take less time to settle than allegations of a
police shooting.
H10: Allegations of a police shooting were likely to take less time to be tried than
allegations of inadequate police training.
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Chapter IV: Data Analysis

The purpose of the study was to examine and describe the impact of allegations of police
misconduct in Kings County, New York during the years 2006-2010 on New York City’s civil
liability. While many studies have documented the financial impact of police misconduct on
municipalities, none had studied the financial impact specific to Kings County, New York and
the New York Police Department.
In this chapter the findings of the study are presented within the context of the research
question in three sections. In the first section frequency distributions, percentages and descriptive
summary statistics are presented to engender an understanding of the data and provide a
foundation for the inferential analyses of sections II and III.
In Section II a multinomial logistic regression analysis was conducted to determine
whether or not a statistically significant relationship existed between the group variable police
misconduct (a false arrest, a police assault, a police shooting and inadequate police training) and the
dependent variable disposition method. The analysis also examined the nature of the relationship
to determine if the gender of the plaintiff and/or whether or not the plaintiff was represented by
legal counsel may have had a confounding effect on the relationship. As opposed to multiple
univariate tests, a multivariate analysis was used to reduce the probability of making a familywise error (Field, 2009).
An examination of the data in Section I revealed that the dependent variables disposition
time and disposition cost were positively skewed outside the boundaries of normality, +3/ -3
(Onwuebuzie & Daniel, 2002). As a result in Section III a non-parametric K independent
samples Kruskal-Wallis analysis was used to determine and examine the relationship between
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police misconduct and the dependent variables disposition time and disposition cost. This
analysis was followed by a series of Mann-Whitney U tests to determine the independence of the
independent variables that comprised the group variable police misconduct.
In the final part of Section III the hypotheses relating to the effect that the disposition
method had on the statistically significant relationships of police misconduct and the dependent
variables disposition cost and disposition time were tested.

Section I
There were 1467 lawsuits (N=1467) available for analysis in the study. This represented
all the lawsuits filed in Kings County, New York for incidents of alleged police misconduct that
occurred in the years 2006-2010 and resolved with civil liability to New York City.
Various descriptive statistics are reported in Table 4.1- 4.1.2. As shown, an
overwhelming number of persons alleging police misconduct were male (76.3%) and so were the
police officers (96.0%) against whom these allegations were made. As in other studies most
lawsuits were brought by a single plaintiff (Chiabi, 1995; Rudovsky, 1992) and in this study
93.4% of all lawsuits were against a lone police officer. Approximately 94.1% of litigants were
represented by counsel while 5.9% represented themselves. In contrast to the other descriptive
statistics, the chosen forum for litigation was less skewed with 68.2% of plaintiffs choosing the
US District Court (federal) to adjudicate their lawsuits and 31.8% choosing a Kings County State
court. Comparatively, a small number of lawsuits (4.5%) were brought by parents on behalf of
their minor children for incidents of police misconduct both on and off of school premises.
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TABLE 4.1 Descriptive Statistics: Plaintiff
Variable

Total

Attributes

Frequency

Percent

Adult/Minor
Plaintiff

N= 1467

Adult
Minor

1401
66

95.5
4.5

One or more
Plaintiffs

N= 1467

One
One +

1264
203

86.2
13.8

Plaintiff Gender

N= 1467

M
F

1119
348

76.3
23.7

TABLE 4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics: Police Officers

Variable

Total

One or more
Officers

N= 708

Officer Gender

N= 747

Variable

Attributes

Frequency

Percent

One
One +
F

661
98
348

93.4
6.6
23.7

M
F

675
89

96.0
4.0

TABLE 4.1.2 Descriptive Statistics: Court & Representation
Total
Attributes
Frequency

Percent

Legal
Representation

N= 1467

Yes
No

1383
84

94.1
5.9

Court

N= 1467

Federal
State

1002
465

68.2
31.8

As shown in Table 4.2 there were 118 allegations that resulted in civil liability to the City
in 2006 compared to 438 in 2010, an increase of more than 371%. The data also showed that
except for an allegation of inadequate police training, the incidence of which peaked in 2009,
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allegations of police misconduct increased yearly during 2006-2010 with the most significant
increase being allegations of false arrest which in 2010 were four times their 2006 amount. More
specifically, while allegations of police shootings and inadequate police training fluctuated
during 2006-2010, allegations of false arrests and police assaults increased steadily in each year
of that period. These statistics appear to be in keeping with the reported increases in the number
of persons being stopped and frisked during the same period.

Table 4.2 No. of Allegations and City’s Liability by Year

Arrest (#)
Assault (#)
Shooting (#)
Training (#)
Totals (#)

2006
50
59
2
7
118

2007
84
127
3
5
219

2008
141
186
4
11
342

2009
144
189
4
13
350

2010

Totals
200
224
5
9
438

619
785
18
45
1467

Of interest was the difference in incidents alleged when comparing units within police
jurisdiction. As presented in Table 4.3 Kings County’s 66th precinct had the lowest number of
allegations made against its officers while the 75th precinct had the highest. Also of interest is the
fact that the top 5 precincts, in terms of the number of police misconduct lawsuits, were in
neighborhoods where the residents are predominantly African Americans and Latinos.
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Table 4.3 Incidents by Police Jurisdiction 2006-2010
Prcnt. #

Freq.

Prcnt. #

Freq.

Prcnt. #

Freq.

60th

41

72nd

25

88th

22

61st

17

73rd

73

90th

26

10

75

th

127

94

76

th

10

Narc/Patrol

135

77

th

13

Transit #30

5

78

th

8

Transit #32

6

79

th

73

Transit #33

4

st

32

Transit #34

6

rd

50

Housing

33

th

12

62

nd

63

rd

66

th

67

th

68

th

69

th

70

th

71

21
5
69
20
22
83

st

50

81
83

84

th

9

Disposition Method
As incidents of police misconduct increased during the years studied so did the
percentage of cases being settled compared to those that went to trial. Table 4.4 shows that twice
as many lawsuits were settled (66.9%) as were tried (33.1%) during 2006-2010. This indicates
that in most lawsuits the parties preferred to settle rather than risk the uncertainty of a jury trial.
However, while there were yearly increases in the number of lawsuits being settled as opposed to
those that went to trial, this was not so for all violations. For as depicted in Fig. A, of the 42
lawsuits alleging inadequate police training only 8 were settled while 37 were disposed of by
jury trial.
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Table 4.4 Incidents: Year and Disposition Method

Year
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2006-2010

No.
Cases
118
219
342
350
438
1467

Percent
Settlement
58.47
52.05
63.45
72.85
72.60
66.32

Percent
Trial
41.53
47.95
36.55
27.15
27.40
33.68

Disposition Cost
Table 4.5 shows that overall the City spent more than $56.2 mil. to dispose of lawsuits
alleging police misconduct that occurred during the years 2006-2010 in Kings County. The data
also showed a steady increase in the yearly costs of police misconduct from $5.1 mil. in 2006 to
more than $15 mil in 2010. Besides, as was expected, disposition cost differed by violation
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alleged. Allegations of false arrest and police assault while responsible for 95.7% of all
allegations, accounted for approximately $41.7 million and 74.3% of the City expenditure for
police misconduct occurring during 2006-2010. In contrast, 45 allegations of inadequate police
training consisting of 3% of all allegations costs approximately $12.1 million and 21.6% of the
City’s civil liability for police misconduct for the years 2006-2010.

Table 4.5 City Disposition in Dollars by Year

2006

2007

2008

2009

747,118

1,605,002

2,857,064

3,898,501

5,312,499

14,420,184

1,850,502

4,871,001

6,060,033

6,776,857

7,820,910

27,379,303

Shooting

125,000

190,000

803,000

567,500

582,250

2,267,750

Training

2,383,463

1,248,503

3,557,500

3,605,500

1,361,000

12,155,966

Totals

5,106,083

7,914,506

13,277,597 14,848,358

15,076,659

56,223,203

Arrest
Assault

2010

Totals

Although the incidents of police misconduct and their resulting costs increased over the
period studied as shown in Table 4.6 their mean cost decreased. For example, the average cost to
settle a lawsuit alleging police misconduct in 2006 was $36,660 but $33,855 in 2010. Similarly,
the average cost of a police misconduct trial was $52,581 in 2006 but $35,922 in 2010.
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Table 4.6 Disposition Method and Costs in Dollars by Year

Year

No.
Cases
Settled

Cost of
Settlements

Avg. Cost
of
Settlement

No.
Cases
Tried

Cost of
Trials

Avg. Cost
of Trial

2006

69

2,529,582

36,660

49

2,576,500

52,581

2007

124

4,403,006

35,508

95

3,511,500

36,963

2008

217

6,653,822

30,662

125

6,623,775

52,990

2009

255

9,236,708

36,222

95

5,616,650

59,070

2010

318

10,766,078

33,855

120

4,310,581

35,922

2006-2010

983

33,589,196

34,581

484

22,639,006

47,505

An analysis of the disposition method by allegation as presented in Fig. B shows that the
average cost of settling a lawsuit alleging a false arrest or a police shooting was more than the
cost of a jury trial. In fact the average cost of a settlement for an allegation of a false arrest was
twice the cost of a trial. However, as predicted by hypotheses 4 and 6 allegations of a police
assault and of inadequate police training were less costly when settlement was the disposition
method.

41

In contrast to the decrease in the average cost to the City for a lawsuit alleging police
misconduct, the cost to a police officer when named as an individual party to the lawsuit steadily
increased during the years from 2006 to 2010. In 2006 the average costs was $30,833 but
$103,625 in 2010. However, the overwhelming majority of police officers were not named
individually, for they were named defendants in only 3 cases in 2006, 2 in 2007, 4 in 2008, 4 in
2009 and 4 in 2010. So, while police officers were personally and partially liable for misconduct
occurring in 2006-2010 in a total of 17 lawsuits, the City was liable in 1467 lawsuits.

Table 4.7 Avg. Cost of Liability: City and Police Officer
Year

Avg. Costs to City

2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Avg. 2006-2010

43,271
36,219
38,823
42,423
34,421
39,031
42

Avg. Cost to Named
Officer
30,833
35,000
58,874
85,750
103,625
67,970

Disposition Time
The mean disposition time (from the filing of a lawsuit to its final resolution) for police
misconduct lawsuits in Kings County for the period studied was 15.72 months, with a range of
an average minimum time of 9.05 months for settlement of a lawsuit alleging a false arrest to
43.87 months for a trial of an allegation of inadequate police training as depicted in Fig. C.
Furthermore, the mean time to dispose of a lawsuit by settlement differed significantly from that
of a trial for the same type of allegation. This was particularly so for allegations of inadequate
police training which took an average of 2.16 months to settle, compared to 43.87 months to be
disposed of by trial.
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Section II

Police Misconduct and Disposition Method
A multinomial logistic regression analysis was used to determine if there was a
statistically significant relationship between the group variable police misconduct and the
dependent variable disposition method, and to examine its nature if it existed. The results
presented in Table 4.9 show an initial log likelihood value of 115.077, and after the independent
variables were accounted for in the logistic regression model, a final log likelihood value of
54.441. The difference between the initial and final log likelihood value, the model’s Chi-square
value of 60.635, had a significance of p = .000 indicating that a statistically significant
relationship existed between police misconduct and the method used to dispose of a lawsuit.
However, while the relationship was weak, (Nagelkerke R2 = .045), overall the model was
accurate for 68.9% of the relationships observed.
The analysis also shows that the gender of the plaintiff did not affect whether or not a
lawsuit was settled or went to trial. By comparison, whether or not the plaintiff was represented
by counsel did. In fact the odds ratios indicate that a lawsuit in which the plaintiff was
represented by counsel was 2.7 times more likely to be disposed of by settlement than by trial.
The standard error values and B coefficients were small indicating that there were no numerical
problems with the model. Wald statistics show that the independent variables that comprise the
group variable police misconduct had independent statistically significant relationships with the
disposition method.
The odds ratio of independent variable to the disposition method shows that a lawsuit in
which the principal allegations was a false arrest or an assault had a positive effect on the
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disposition model and was more than 9 times more likely to be settled than proceed to a jury
trial. An allegation of a police shooting was 11.6 times more likely to be settled than tried.
Finally, an allegation of inadequate police training had a 9% more likelihood of being tried rather
than settled.
In summary the results indicate statistical significant support for hypotheses 1, 3, 5 and 7.

Table 4.8 Regression: Police Misconduct and Disposition Method
Model Fitting
-2 Log likelihood (intercept) Chi-square: 115.077
Model

R2

Chi-square

-2 Log Likelihood

0.45

54.441

Improvement

60.355

df

Significance

5

.000

Classification Table Disposition Method
Predicted
Observed

Settlement

Trial

Percent correct

Settlement

973

8

99.2%

Trial

447

37

7.6%

Overall

96.9%

3.1%

68.9%

Likelihood Ratio Tests
Model Fitting

Likelihood Ratio

Effect

-2 Log Likelihood Model

Chi-square

Df

Significance

Gender (Plaintiff)

54.613

1.72

1

.678

Representation (plaintiff)

67.018

12.577

1

.000

Police Misconduct

101.279

49.684

3

.000
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Table 4.9 Significant Predictors (Reference: Trial)
Variable

Wald

Df

Significance

Exp(B)

Gender (Plaintiff)

.171

1

.679

1.057

Representation (Plaintiff)

10.350

1

.001

2.718

Settlement/ Arrest

32.835

1

.000

9.924

Settlement/ Assault

32.875

1

.000

9.823

Settlement/ Shooting

13.961

1

.000

11.685

.000

.099

Significant Predictors (Reference: Settlement)
Trial/ Training

34.403

1

Section III

A Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted to evaluate the differences among the four
independent variables of the group variable police misconduct (arrest, assault, shooting, training)
and their relationships with both disposition time and disposition cost. Tied ranks were corrected
with the substitution of the median.
As shown in Table 4.8, overall there was a statistically significant relationship between
disposition time and police misconduct, χ² (3, N=1467) = 98.400, p = .000 with a mean rank
disposition time of 651.29 for a false arrest, 764.31 for a police assault, 924.94 for a police
shooting and 1250.92 for an allegation of inadequate police training. Similarly, there was a
statistically significant relationship between disposition cost and police misconduct, χ² (3,
N=1467) = 211.344, p = .000 with a mean rank disposition cost of 574.52 for a false arrest,
819.56 for a police assault, 1083.19 for a police shooting and 1255.46 for an allegation of
inadequate police training.
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Table 4.10 Independent-Samples Median Test
Dependent Variable

Disposition Time

Disposition Cost

1467

1467

Mean Rank (False Arrest)

651.29

574.52

Mean Rank (Police Assault)

764.31

819.56

Mean Rank (Police Shooting)

924.94

1083.19

Mean Rank (Inadequate police training)

1250.92

1295.46

Test Statistic

98.400

211.344

3

3

.000

.000

N

Degrees of Freedom
Asymptotic Sig.

While the Kruskal-Wallis test determined that there were statistically significant
relationships between the independent variables as a group and both disposition time and
disposition cost, to determine the nature of the relationship, (i.e., independence of each
independent variable and its individual relationship with disposition time and disposition cost), a
series of Mann-Whitney U tests of two-way comparisons were conducted. Effect size values for
each compared pair were manually calculated. The results are presented in Table 4.8.1 below.
There were statistically significant differences in the distributions of the independent
variables within the group variable police misconduct to affect both disposition time and
disposition cost. Specifically, all four independent variables had statistically significant
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independent effects on disposition cost. However, when paired, a police assault and a police
shooting did not have a statistically significant effect on the dependent variable disposition time;
whereas the remaining paired comparisons were statistically significant. In other words, a police
assault and a police shooting were not independent of each other in their effect on the time it
took to dispose of the lawsuit.
In summary the Kruskal-Wallis tests followed by post-hoc Mann-Whitney U tests
showed that except for the relationship of police assaults and police shooting on disposition time,
the individual variables that comprised police misconduct had independent effects on both the
time it took to dispose of a lawsuit and the cost of settlement or jury award.

Table 4.11 Independent Variables on Disposition Time and Disposition Cost
Variable
Disposition Time
Disposition Cost
Statistic
df
Sig.
Eff. Size Statistic
df
Sig
Eff. Size
Arrest/Assault
204552.000
1
.000
-0.1350
151999.000
1
.000 -0.3232
Arrest/Shooting
3474.000
1
.006
-0.1080
2217.000
1
.000 -0.1730
Arrest/Training
3234.000
1
.000
-0.3341
809.500
1
.000 -0.4104
Assault/Shooting
5476.000
1
.104
-0.0057
4039.500
1
.002 -0.1099
Assault/Training
5280.000
1
.000
-0.2746
1533.500
1
.000 -0.3583
Shooting/Training
174.000
1
.000
-0.4424
193.000
1
.001 -0.4068

Police Misconduct and Disposition Cost
Binomial logistic regressions were performed to test hypotheses 2, 4, 6, and 8. Table
4.10.1 shows that the model explained a low 15% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance of the
interaction of an arrest and settlement with disposition cost and was accurate in 69.3 % of the
interactions observed (Table 4.10.2). The Wald statistic (135.4006, p = .000) presented in Table
4.10.3 indicates that the interaction had a statistically significant contribution to the disposition
cost and that a one unit change in the interaction would result in a 40% change in the disposition
cost. As such there was statistically significant support for the hypothesis that allegations of false
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arrest were likely to result in a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition
method than if tried by a jury.
The binomial regression model presented in Table 4.10.1 explained 29% (Nagelkerke R2)
of the variance in the interaction of a police assault and settlement as the disposition method with
disposition cost. The model was accurate in 66.6% of the interactions observed. The Wald
statistic 29.545, p = .000, shows that the interaction was a statistically significant contributor to
predicting that allegations of assault/battery were likely to result in a smaller final disposition
when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury. As such, hypothesis 4 was
supported.
For hypothesis 6 which states that allegations of a police shooting were likely to result in
a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition method than if tried by a jury,
Table 4.10.1 shows that the model explained a low 2% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance of an
allegation of a police shooting and settlement interacting with disposition cost. The model was
accurate in 92.9 % of the interactions observed (Table 4.10.2). The Wald statistic (1.332, p =
.249, p > .05) presented in Table 4.10.3 indicates that the interaction did not have a statistically
significant contribution to the disposition cost. As such, there was no statistically significant
support for hypothesis 6.
Lastly, as presented in Table 4.10.1 the binomial regression model explained 30%
(Nagelkerke R2) of the variance of the interaction of an allegation of inadequate police training
and settlement with disposition cost. Overall the model was accurate in 97.2% of the interactions
observed. Furthermore, the Wald statistic 96.259, p = .000, p < 0.5, shows that the interaction
was a statistically significant contributor to the prediction that allegations of inadequate police
training were likely to result in a smaller final disposition when a jury trial was the disposition
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method than when settled. Furthermore, the odds ratio (Exp(B)) shows that a one unit change in
the interaction would result in only a 1% change in the odds of a trial as the disposition method
and therefore hypothesis 8 was supported.
Table 4.12.1 Model Summary
Variable

Step

-2 Log Likelihood

Nagelkerke R2

Arrest/Settlement

< Median Disp. Cost

1642.323

.150

Assault/Settlement

< Median Disp. Cost

1838.423

.029

Shooting/Settlement

< Median Disp. Cost

749.626

.002

Training/Settlement

< Median Disp. Cost

269.981

.305

Table 4.12.2 Classification
Variable

Predicted < Median

Overall % Correct

Arrest/Settlement

920

69.3

Assault/Settlement

977

66.6

Shooting/Settlement

1363

92.9

Training/Trial

1426

97.2

Table 4.12.3 Variables in the Equation
Variable

B

Arrest/Settlement

-2.810

Assault/Settlement

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.241 135.406

1

.000

.060

.710

.058

29.545

1

.000

.339

Shooting/Settlement

.481

.417

1.332

1

.249

1.618

Training/Trial

3.754

.209

96.259

1

.000

.001

50

Police Misconduct and Disposition Time
Two binomial logistic regressions were performed to test hypothesis 9 and 10. The
analysis presented in Table 4.11.1 shows that the regression model explained 26.6% (Nagelkerke
R2) of the variance of the interaction of an assault and settlement with disposition time. The
Wald statistic (F(113.260,1 p = .000) presented in Table 4.11.2 indicates statistical significance
for the prediction that allegations of an assault were likely to take less time to settle than
allegations of a police shooting, thus supporting hypothesis #9.
Hypothesis 10 was also supported in that the binomial logistic regression model
explained 14.1% of the variance of the interaction of police shooting lawsuits that went to trial
with the median time. The model was statistically significant (F= (176.310, p =.000), and was
accurate for 72.9% of the interactions observed, and a unit increase in the interaction resulted in
only a 33% change in the disposition time.

Table 4.13.1 Model Summary
Variable

Step

-2 Log Likelihood

Nagelkerke R2

Assault/Settlement

< Median Disp. Time

1389.796

.216

Shooting/Trial

< Median Disp. Time

1474.180

.141

Table 4.13.2 Classification
Variable

Predicted < Median

Overall % Correct

Arrest/Settlement

1114

74.8

Shooting/Trial

1069

72.9
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Table 4.13.3 Variables in the Equation
Variable

B

S.E.

Arrest/Settlement

5.391

Shooting/Trial

-3.394

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

.507 113.260

1

.000

219.508

.329 176.310

1

.000

.033

Summary
Analysis of the data revealed that overall there were statistically significant relationships
between police misconduct, the method by which the City disposed of a lawsuit against the
NYPD, its cost and the time it took to reach the disposition. In addition, as Table 4.14 shows, all
hypotheses were supported except Hypothesis 6. Specifically, the analysis showed no
statistically significant support for the prediction that allegations of a police shooting were likely
to result in a smaller final disposition when settlement was the disposition method than when
tried by a jury.

Table 4.14 Interpreting Results of Hypotheses
Hypothesis

p-Value

Sig. p-Value

Interpretation

Conclusion

Hyp. 1

p = .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 2

p < .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 3

p = .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 4

p = .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 5

P = .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 6

P = .249

P > 0.5

Strong evidence for Ho

Fail to Reject Ho

Hyp. 7

P = .000

P < 0.5

Weak evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 8

P = .000

P < 0.5

Weak evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 9

p= .000

P < 0.5

Strong evidence against Ho

Reject Ho

Hyp. 10

p= .000

P < 0.5

Moderate evidence against Ho

Reject Ho
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Chapter V: Findings, Discussion and Policy Implications

In this chapter the principal findings and conclusions of the study are reviewed and
discussed within the context of the research hypotheses. Based on the findings several
conclusions, policy implications and recommendations are made.

Findings
The study examined the impact of police misconduct in Kings County on New York
City’s civil liability during the years 2006-2010. Using allegations of police misconduct that
resulted in a settlement or jury award as a measure of police misconduct, the study provided
evidence of the increasing costs of police misconduct in Kings County.
Specifically, the study found that most police defendants were male as were most of the
individuals alleging police misconduct. In fact female police officers were under-represented in
lawsuits in Kings County given that reportedly they comprise 34% of total number of sworn
officers of the NYPD (NYC Workforce Project Report, 2013). Disproportionality was also
present in violations alleged when analyzed by police jurisdictions with the 75th precinct having
the most lawsuits brought against its officers and the 66th having the least.
Of the allegations comprising police misconduct, false arrests were the most numerous
comprising 54.14% of all violations alleged, followed by allegations of police assault. Together,
allegations of false arrests and police assaults accounted for 95.7% of the total number of
allegations made and 74.3% of the City’s total civil liability for police misconduct in Kings
County for the years studied.
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The study also found that an allegation of inadequate police training that was tried before
a jury was the most costly to the City with an average cost of $175,000, while a false arrest
allegation, with an average cost of $8,500 when tried was the least costly.
Based on previous studies, in particular that of Gould and Mastrofski (2004), it was
hypothesized that a lawsuit based on the principal allegation of a false arrest would be more
likely to settle than go to trial. The data showed that of the 619 allegations of false arrest more
than 68% were settled and the analysis provided statistically significant support for this
prediction. In contrast, the analysis provided statistically significant support for settlement of an
arrest allegation being less costly than a trial. The data did not bear this out for it was more than
twice as expensive to settle arrest allegations, than to try them before a jury. For all other
allegations the study found settlement to be the less expensive method of disposition.
Lastly, legal representation, and not gender of the plaintiff was statistically significant in
determining whether or not a lawsuit was settled or tried. The majority of litigants were
represented by counsel and the majority of cases were settled (54.4%) with an average
disposition time ranging from 9.05 months to settle an allegation of a false arrest to 20.16 months
for settlement of an allegation of inadequate police training.
Overall, although the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct almost quadrupled
from 2006 to 2010, the average cost of a lawsuit alleging police misconduct decreased
significantly during the years studied from $43,271 in 2006 to $34,421 in 2010. By comparison,
the personal cost to the police officer when named as an individual defendant increased
significantly from $30,833 in 2006 to $103,625 in 2010.

54

Discussion
The study produced both anticipated and unexpected results in that although many of the
relationships identified were anticipated, some were not.
It was anticipated, in part due to the City’s Stop, Question and Possibly Frisk policy, that
not only would there be increases in the number of lawsuits alleging police misconduct, but that
most plaintiffs would allege assault/battery or false arrest as their principal allegation and that
together false arrest and police assault would account for the major part of the City’s civil
liability. Also anticipated was the finding that most individuals alleging police misconduct would
be represented by counsel and that legal representation would be predictive of whether or not a
lawsuit would be settled or would proceed to trial.
As to individual allegations it was anticipated that on average it would be less costly to
settle a lawsuit than to proceed to trial; however, settling a lawsuit when the principal allegation
was a false arrest was shown to be a lot more costly than a jury trial. Nonetheless, the data shows
that 68.7% of the 619 lawsuits alleging false arrest were settled although on average it costs
$11,500 more to do so. The likely reasons for this practice could be the sheer number of false
arrest lawsuits and the extended disposition time indicative of the litigation costs of a trial
compared to a settlement.
The most costly of the allegations found by the study was that of inadequate police
training, which on average was $25,000 more costly when tried before a jury than when settled
and had a much longer disposition time of 43.87 months for trial compared to 20.16 months for
settlement. Still, 82.2% of lawsuits alleging inadequate police training were disposed of by trial
rather than with a settlement even though it was more costly to the City to do so. One likely
explanation for this is that plaintiff’s settlement demand was a lot higher than what was offered
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by the City and City attorneys believed that a jury award, particularly in a low profile lawsuit,
would be less than plaintiff’s demand. Conversely, it is also possible that plaintiff’s attorney
believed that a jury award would be larger than the amount offered by City attorneys.
What was unexpected, however, were the yearly decreases in the average cost of a
lawsuit to the City, and in contrast the increases in the average cost to the police officer when a
named defendant in the lawsuit. Interestingly, as an ancillary finding, all 17 lawsuits in which a
police officer was found to be individually liable for the violation alleged were jury trials. Unlike
other counties in New York State, juries in Kings County and the Bronx tend to reflect the racial
composition of the county (NYS Chief Administrative Law Judge Report, 2011). With nonwhites comprising 56% of the population of Kings County (U.S. Census, 2010) and the top five
precincts in terms of violations alleged all having jurisdiction in neighborhoods of color most
affected by “Stop and Frisk”, it is possible that jury awards in these trials reflect the sentiment of
jurors towards police officers and not the actual evidence presented in lawsuits.
Furthermore, because police officers’ CCRB files are subject to disclosure, it is possible
that as suggested by control theory the individually named officers may have had multiple
civilian complaints and disciplinary actions against them in their disclosed personnel files which
may have influenced the jury resulting in higher awards against them.
Also, although it was anticipated that there would be differences in allegations when
examined by police jurisdiction, it was not anticipated that the 75th Precinct would have more
than 25 times the number of lawsuits filed against its officers as the 66th Precinct, which had the
lowest number of allegations. For context, available data published by the NYPD shows that
during the years 2001-2013 incidents of reported crime decreased 85% from 7,927 to 1,191 in
the 66th Precinct compared to a smaller decrease of 69% from 12,273 to 3,902 in the 75th Precinct
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(NYPD CompStat, 2014). Therefore, it is quite possible that, particularly in a high crime police
jurisdiction, such as in the 75th Precinct, the high number of lawsuits is the price of doing
business as some have suggested (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993).
Another possible explanation that is suggested by differential theory is that in these
precincts with relatively high number of lawsuits against its officers there is a police subculture
that tolerates and may even accept police misconduct. Although only 6.6% of the lawsuits of the
study involved multiple police officers, and while it is outside the scope of this study it would be
interesting to determine if these 47 lawsuits were concentrated in any particular precincts or
dispersed throughout Kings County. For as suggested by differential association, such group
malfeasance or collusion may show acceptance of definitions favorable to the violation of law
existing in those particular precincts.
In conclusion the increasing financial impact that police misconduct had on the City
during the years studied was not the result of increasing costs of the lawsuit per se but rather the
increase in the number of lawsuits vis-à-vis the increase in the incidence of police misconduct.

Limitations of the Study
There are several possible limitations to the study. First, in using allegations of police
misconduct to measure police misconduct, it is recognized that not all incidents of police
misconduct result in a civil lawsuit. Indeed, police misconduct lawsuits are incidents of alleged
misconduct that have been brought to the attention of the judicial system. As such it is possible
that incidents of police misconduct may be more numerous than the number of lawsuits filed.
Second, there are frivolous lawsuits and therefore even when a settlement or judgment
results, in other words an admission or finding of police misconduct, it is quite possible that what
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was alleged may not have occurred.57 This limitation is evident in the fact that for the years
studied a low 3% of police misconduct claims filed with the CCRB was substantiated.58
However, despite this low degree of substantiation it is recognized that because police officials
and officers tend to define police misconduct narrowly while the public defines it broadly
(Adams, 1996; Lersch, 1998b; Lersch and Mieczkowski, 2000), and complaints include claims
such as the use of foul language and discourtesies, which are not legally actionable, arguably 3%
substantiation is not truly indicative of the frivolity of some legal claims.
Thus, while the use of lawsuits to examine police misconduct in Kings County provided a
select sample of cases, they provided a reliable and credible source of information due to the
scrutiny of many different professionals engaged in the adversarial judicial process and therefore
these limitations did not threaten the validity of the study.

Policy Implications
The finding that overall the impact of police misconduct on the City’s civil liability is the
result of increases in the number of lawsuits being filed, i.e. the incidence of police misconduct
and not a rise in the average cost of the lawsuit, points to a two-prong approach to policies
regarding police misconduct and its impact on civil liability of New York City. First, policies
aimed at preventing police misconduct, and second policies aimed at managing its costs when it
occurs.
Preventing police misconduct starts at the academy. Past research shows that cadets are
concerned about work-related lawsuits (Scogin and Brodsky, 1991) but on becoming a part of a
subculture that may accept police misconduct as a way of doing business, their conduct is not
only shaped by the subculture (Kappeler et al., 1998) but they become more accepting of
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misconduct as they progress from academy to the streets (Savitz, 1970). Therefore, beyond the
possibility of dismissal from the NYPD, cadets should be instructed not only of the potential
personal costs they face for misconduct when they are named individually in a lawsuit, but also
as important, the civil liability to the City and the social cost to its residents.
While preventing police misconduct requires additional misconduct specific instruction at
the academy, it is recognized that this may not be enough as police officers and officials are
often unaware of the outcomes of police misconduct lawsuits (Skolnick & Fyfe, 1993). This
suggests that police officers must be informed of the legal proceeding in which they are
involved. Continued awareness of the existence and potential cost of police misconduct may
mean regular updates of on-going lawsuits at roll call or, and, one-on-one meetings with their
supervisors so that they may be more aware of the impact of their conduct on their department
and the City. Awareness may also mean the creation of a database specific to police misconduct
actions and issuance of reports to individual officers and their supervisors keeping them apprised
of the progress of the lawsuit. For if police misconduct lawsuits are inevitable, not because they
result from aggressive policing but from the subjective difference of 34,000 police officers
defining inappropriate conduct narrowly and 8 million New Yorkers defining it broadly, then the
study suggests that current policies that have led to decreases in the average cost of a lawsuit for
the years studied should continue. Specifically, the findings suggest that there should be a
vigorous effort to increase the use settlement rather than jury trials not only because on average
settlement is 37% less costly but additionally the time to get to disposition is on average
approximately 50% less for a settlement than for a trial.
In spite of these recommendations, it is realized that there will always be outliers, i.e.,
police officers who are undeterred by civil lawsuits. For example, a recent report by the New
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York Daily News detailed a two-month investigation of the most sued police officers in New
York City.59 According to the report 55 NYPD officers, who had more than 10 lawsuits against
each of them, were responsible for a total of 609 misconduct lawsuits and $6 million in civil
liability. One particular officer had been sued 28 times in the past 8 years at a cost to the City of
$1.3 mil. When presented with the cost of his conduct to the City, the detective allegedly replied
“I am unaware of that” and “once it goes to court, I don’t follow it”, supporting the contention of
Skolnick and Fyfe (1993). From this it appears that existing accountability mechanisms need to
be reformed and, where inadequate, new mechanisms put in place. One possible accountability
mechanism could require the police officer involved in the alleged violation, even when he or
she is not a named defendant, to be informed of the progress of the lawsuit through regular,
required communications with City attorneys.
If all else fails then officers who continually engage in misconduct should be taken off of
the streets and assigned to desk duty or dismissed.

Directions for Future Research
Prior research has provided a general understanding of the relationship of police
misconduct and civil liability. This study provided a more nuanced understanding of police
misconduct in Kings County, New York.
Future studies can build on this research particularly in the area of a more expansive
measure for litigation costs. Furthermore, while this research did not evaluate the adequacy of
NYPD training programs at preventing police misconduct, it showed the continuing need for
programs that address the impact that police misconduct has on the civil liability of the City of
the New York. One possibility for future research therefore would be an evaluation of the
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adequacy of current NYPD academy training programs specific to the prevention of police
misconduct. Lastly, the finding of disproportionality in the number of lawsuits when analyzed by
precinct suggests a more in-depth precinct-level analysis in the future that could explain the
extent to which police misconduct at that level is accepted as a way of doing business in certain
police precincts in Kings County, New York.
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End Notes
1

Of notable exception is the view that some police departments accept increased civil liability as
the price for aggressive policing (Armacost, 2003). Others even encourage civil liability by
appearing to be tough on crime as a way of increasing police funding for their departments
(Miller & Wright, 2000).

2

Starting with Elizabeth Holtzman (1989-1993), successive comptrollers (William Thompson
2002-2009; John Liu 2009-current) have expressed concern and made various administrative
efforts to reduce civil liability that results from police misconduct. Infra see note at 1.

3

In general a lawsuit alleging unconstitutional policies or practices is brought against a
municipality, in this case the City, and not the police department itself. In New York this is
codified in Sec. 396 of the New York City Charter which in relevant part states that “all
actions . . . for the violation of any law should be brought in the name of the City of New
York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.” McKinney’s
Laws at 200.

4

John C. Liu., City of N.Y. Office of the Comptroller, Claims Report: Fiscal Years 2009-2010,
(2011), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bla/pdf/2010_Claims_Report.pdf.

5

Although this study is primarily concerned with lawsuits brought by civilians against the
NYPD, it should be noted that some costly lawsuits against the City are brought by police
officers themselves. One such lawsuit which resulteded in a $4.5 million jury award that was
subsequently overturned on appeal involved a police officer shooting himself in the leg while
leaning back on a chair of his precinct and later alleging in his lawsuit that the cause of his
injury was a defective chair. Scott Shiref. New York Daily News, p.5. November 27, 2009.

6

Thompson, William. City of N.Y. Office of the Comptroller, Claims Report: Fiscal Years
2001-2005, (2005), available at
http://www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/bla/pdf/2005_Claims_Report.pdf.

7

The Eastern District refers to the federal judicial area that includes the New York Counties of
Kings, Queens, Richmond, Nassau and Suffolk whereas the Southern District includes
Manhattan and Bronx counties.

8

A full explanation begins on pg. 15.

9

In an attempt to address his concerns over increases in the number of lawsuits and resulteding
civil liability, in 2006 former New York City Comptroller, William Thompson, Jr., created a
special unit within the City’s Law Department to review and investigate police misconduct
cases with a goal towards early settlement. (Thompson, 2007).
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10

A formal complaint filed with the CCRB is an allegation of an injury that resulted from
alleged police misconduct. Whereas a formal complaint sought investigation and possible
disciplinary action against the officer, a claim is filed with the Comptroller because it sought
compensation from the individual officer and or the City for the injury sustained as a resulted
of the alleged police misconduct. Both procedures are independent of each other and can
occur simultaneously.

11

The term “agency” was used in this study to designate any City entity under the administrative
control of the Mayor of New York.

12

The gravity of the problem has become so acute that 13 months after this researcher committed
to the proposed study, the City created a special unit within the Corporation Counsel’s office
consisting of 29 attorneys and 16 support staff for the sole purpose of defending tort lawsuits
against the NYPD. Keshner, Andrew. “Law Dept. Launches Unit to Defend State Torts
Against NYPD.” New York Law Journal, 15 May 2013.

13

§1983 lawsuits are lawsuits in which an individual alleges that a government employee acting
under color of law violated his or her federal constitutional or statutory rights. Violations of
state constitutional rights or city ordinances are not actionable under §1983.

14

Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens actions are §1983 lawsuits
against federal employees that allege a violation of the 4th and 14th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution or of a federal statute.

15

The CCRB is an independent, all civilian New York City agency and is not part of the NYPD.
The CCRB is “empowered to receive, investigate, hear, make findings” concerning alleged
NYPD officer misconduct, and make recommendations for possible disciplinary action, to the
NYPD. http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/home.html

16

The CCRB receives many complaints against police officers that it has no authority to accept
and investigate. Such complaints are referred to the appropriate City agency for investigation.

17

A review of more than 15,000 NYPD Stop and Possibly Frisk reports by then Attorney
General Elliot Spitzer and Columbia University’s Center for Violence Research and
Prevention found that approximately 39% were constitutionally questionable.

18

U.S. Const., Amend. IV.

19

The legitimate use of force distinguishes law enforcement from other branches of government
(Kobler, 1975). As such police officers are granted qualified immunity for using reasonable
force regardless of the injury that resulteds as long as they were acting in good faith
(Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 1987).
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20

These lawsuits may also fall under CCRB jurisdiction because, in addition to allegations of
serious physical injury or death, there may be other misconduct allegations. Thus for a single
incident of police misconduct it is possible to have two parallel ongoing investigations at the
same time. However, the police commissioner has the authority to “remove CCRB’s authority
where there is an ongoing IAB or criminal investigation against an officer or where the officer
has neither a disciplinary record nor any substantiated CCRB complaints.” Baker, Al.
Independent Agency Gets New Powers to Prosecute New York Police Officers. New York
Times, March 27, 2012.

21

https://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/html/complaint.html

22

This was an 18% increase over 2009 and represented “the largest number of new police action
filings during the last fiscal year.” See note at 4.

23

See also (Novak, Smith and Frank, 2003; Ross, 2000; Vaughn et al., 2001).

24

Whereas the Bernadine decision gave individuals the right to sue a municipality for the
negligent and wrongful acts of its employees, because of the home rule doctrine, a
municipality can limit its non civil rights’ civil liability by limiting an individual’s right to
bring a lawsuit. One example is the City’s local law (General Municipal Law, Article 4, § 50e) which dictates that prior to the commencement of a lawsuit the City must be made aware of
the alleged incident from which the lawsuit arises by the filing of a Notice of Claim by the
injured party within 90 days of the date of incident.

25

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)

26

In this case the City of Memphis had a formal policy permitting police officers to shoot at a
fleeing person regardless of the threat posed by that person to the officer or other individuals.

27

While 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1871) covers civil remedies, 18 U.S.C. §242 (1866) covers federal
criminal prosecution which quite often proceeds before or at the same time with the civil
lawsuit. A recent example of this was the 1997 case of Abner Louima. The police officers and
the City were subject to civil liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the officers were
criminally prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §242.

28

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1871). The Act is invoked whenever a government official, in this case the
individual police officer, violates a federally guaranteed right of an individual. For example,
an illegal search, false arrest or police brutality.

29

See del Carmen, Rolando and Michael R. Smith. (2001). “Police, Civil liability, and the Law”
In Dunham, Roger G., and Geoffrey OP. Alpert, Critical Issues in Policing: Contemporary
Readings. (4th ed.). (pp. 181-189), Prospects Heights, IL: Waveland Press, Inc.
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30

Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This case
involved a then New York City policy that required pregnant employees to take unpaid leave
before it was medically required. The impacted women sued the City alleging that the policy
was unconstitutional in that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.

31

In most lawsuits both the NYPD and the individual officer are named defendants. The reason
for naming both as defendants lies in the fact that the City is the proverbial “deep pocket”
defendant who in most lawsuits pursuant to GML 50-k will indemnify the individual police
officer.

32

See note infra at 41.

33

See Note at supra at 15.

34

According to the U.S. Supreme Court “color” of law means “pretense” of law (Screws v. U.S.,
1945:91). In other words a police officer is civilly liable if in pursuit of his or her official duty
the officer causes an injury that violates a federal constitutional or statutory right. In applying
this interpretation courts must first determine if the officer was indeed acting under color of
law and thereafter determine if his or her actions violated the individual’s federal
constitutional or statutory right. Vaughn and Coomes (1995) argue that the order of
determination should be reversed in that what should be determined first is whether or not a
federal constitution or statutory right was violated and thereafter if the violator was acting
under color of law.

35

42 U.S.C. §1988 codifies the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney Fee Award Act which is intended to
encourage attorneys to accept lawsuits of civil rights violations from those most in need of
civil rights protection but least able to afford an attorney.

36

Attorneys’ fees and punitive damages are sometimes many times larger than the other awards
of an actual settlement or jury award. For example in Preston v. City of New York and P.O.
Edward Cunningham the total judgment was $80,000 with $5000 going to the plaintiff for her
unlawful detention and $75,000 for attorneys fees (her attorneys had requested $300,000 in
fees).

37

City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 575 (1986) (“The damages a plaintiff recovers
contributed significantly to the deterrence of civil rights violations in the future . . .
particularly in the area of individual police misconduct, where injunctive relief generally is
unavailable.”

38

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). The court held that a police officer’s violation of
the state’s “knock and announce” statute does not warrant suppression of the evidence found
and that in this particular violation, civil liability, and not the exclusionary rule, is the
deterrent against an illegal search.
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39

According to Kappeler (2001:50), “the prospect of civil liability has a deterrent effect in the
abstract . . . but . . . does not have a major impact on field practices” of police officers. In a
survey of 1,050 police chiefs, Vaughn et al. (2001) found that most supported the use of civil
liability to deter police misconduct and while they considered the prospect of civil liability
when making administrative decisions, they believed that concerns of civil liability rarely
leads to change in police practices.

40

For example, Hall et al. (2003) found that 48% of police officers found that the threat of civil
liability deters police conduct, compared to 62% in a study done by Garrison (1995).

41

As noted by Walker (2001:10) “there is no [U.S. Supreme] Court decision barring a police
officer from calling someone on the street a ‘scumbag’ or an ‘asshole.’ ”

42

In fact Skolnick & Fyfe (1993) contend that not only are officers and officials unaware of the
results of police misconduct and the policy implications that come with the results but some
police officials may see civil liability as “the costs of doing business.”

43

See note 44.

44

Some NYPD rules and regulations far exceed what New York State law authorizes. For
example, the use of deadly, physical force against a fleeing felon. New York law authorizes
deadly physical force if the perpetrator is armed and fleeing after committing a violent felony.
However, the NYPD authorizes deadly physical force ONLY if it is necessary to stop an
imminent threat of death or serious physical injury (emphasis added). New York Patrol Guide.

45

Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 (1977).

46

See note 44.

47

For example, police sergeant Dorst agreed to pay $5000 of a $250,000 settlement. Dorst was
alleged to have sexually harassed a subordinate police officer by repeatedly demanding sex
from her while telling her that “it is going to be the best one minute of your life.” John
Marzulli. Harassed Cop Wins 250G. It’ll be best minute of your life, creepy sarge told her.
N.Y. Daily News, December 20, 2006. Sec.: News, p. 18.

48

In lawsuits in which the police officer is charged with intentionally violating the individual’s
constitutional rights, the City refuses to defend and indemnify the named police officer
accused of constitutional violations, the police union steps in and does both. See Louima v.
City of New York et al. In this case defendants settled for $8.6 million dollars with the City
paying $7 million and the PBA, the remaining $1.6 million. William Rashbaum. Settlement
Talks Stall in Louima Suit Against City & PBA. N.Y. Times, March 28, 2001.
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49

For NYPD officers, part of the legal process in a §1983 lawsuit alleging police misconduct is
the disclosure of the CCRB’s file of the police officer who is alleged to have committed the
violation. The officer’s CCRB file (with personal information such as his home address
redacted) contains information on all formal complaints brought against him or her, the results
of all past investigations and the disciplinary actions that ensued. Disclosure information from
the CCRB file may be exhibited to the jury if the lawsuit goes to trial, or may serve as
bargaining chips when settlement is negotiated.

50

It should be noted that, according to Hirschi, there are no deviant subcultures just variance in
an individual’s attachment, involvement, commitment to, and belief in, the norms of their
society (1969).

51

§1983 lawsuits, which allege state violations in addition to federal claims, the lawsuit can be
brought in either forum.

52

A state court can adjudicate federal Civil Rights Claims. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131
(1988).

53

In practice because of expediency and more expansive discovery in federal courts, lawsuits
against the NYPD are often litigated in both federal and state courts concurrently and on
completion of discovery, discontinued in the federal court. One reason plaintiff attorneys give
for their preference for continuance in a state court as opposed to a federal court is that in
federal courts unanimous verdicts are required whereas in state courts they are not.

54

A lawsuit alleging police misconduct can be brought in a federal court only if a “federal
question is presented.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).

55

Although hiring, training and retention, it is one cause of action (in other words one
allegation).

56

In their study of police searches Gould and Mastrofski reported that a panel of Fourth
Amendment experts (a former federal prosecutor, a state appellate judge and a government
attorney among others) found that more than 39% of the stops they observed were
unconstitutional.

57

In 2008 a Maryland jury awarded $2.4 million dollars for a police shooting even though the
U.S. Department of Justice found that the police officer acted appropriately. Ruben
Castaneda, “Man Who Was Shot by Officer Wins $2.4 Million Judgment” The Washington
Post, March 1, 2008.

58

Id. At 16.

59

Paddock, Barry. Detective is NYPD’s most-sued cop, 28 lawsuits filed against him since 2006.
NY Daily News. September 29, 2014.
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